Up@dawn 2.0

Monday, February 17, 2020

Roger Penrose on Consciousness


Penrose’s explanation of consciousness:

Roger Penrose presents an intriguing view on consciousness, however before I explain this view, we must first understand what exactly he means by ‘consciousness’. While most would prefer a clear definition, Penrose himself states, “I do not think it is wise, at this stage of understanding, to attempt to propose a precise definition of consciousness, but we can rely, to good measure, on our subjective impressions and intuitive common sense to what the term means and when this property of consciousness is likely to be present.” (Penrose, 1989). So what is meant by this?
In order to understand Roger Penrose’s way of thinking about consciousness, it is first beneficial to understand his world view. Penrose breaks our universe or reality into three worlds: 1) the Physical- tables, blankets, etc., 2) the Abstract- mathematics, ‘how it is’, etc. and 3) the Mental- experiences, feelings, etc. and it is here in the Mental world that he places consciousness, however do not confuse this with ‘what consciousness is’ (I will be explaining this in a later section of my paper). These three worlds contain certain relations with one another which lead us to what Penrose then describes as the three mysteries. 
The first mystery acknowledges how extraordinarily precise mathematical principles are in the way they govern the physical world (it is my interpretation with this he is showing a relationship between the physical and the abstract worlds). These are scientifically proven/ discovered principles that explain why the physical world we experience is the way it is. It is stressed here that mathematics are discovered by us, not invented which is why Penrose refers to them as a mystery, they are what they are as precise as they are without our existence. The next mystery posed we don’t yet understand is how does consciousness arise given the preciseness of these known physical laws when the circumstances are right? For example, physical laws apply to a glass of water however it is widely accepted that a glass of water is not conscious, yet somehow consciousness arises within us where these same physical laws apply (again, my interpretation is he is showing the relationship between the mental and physical worlds building off the previously given understanding of the relationship between the physical and the abstract world from mystery one.) The final mystery is our ability to use our conscious understanding to comprehend mathematics (interpreted as the relationship between the mental and the abstract worlds to understand the physical world). Taking these world views we can use this basic framework of our reality to focus in on what Penrose believes consciousness is.
There are three categorizes as to what consciousness ‘is’ based on implicit assumptions or beliefs about consciousness according to Penrose. The first is that consciousness is an ‘actual, scientifically describable ‘thing.’ (Penrose, 1989). This ‘thing’ ‘does something’ to benefit what possesses it, for example our conscious access of the mental world allows us to utilize our comprehension to try and understand consciousness in terms of the relation between the abstract and the physical worlds. Another view is that consciousness is a naturally associated ‘thing’ that serves as a control system, such as in AI. The final view is that there is a divine or ‘mysterious’ purpose behind consciousness.
Penrose falls into the first category, believing there is a more scientific bases behind what consciousness is, relying on the anthropic principle (the nature of the universe that we find ourselves in is strongly constrained by the requirement that sentient beings like ourselves must actually be present to observe it.) (Penrose, 1989). By this thought process, Penrose’s best explanation of his view of consciousness is perhaps described as a ‘genuine scientifically describable phenomenon, playing an active as well as passive role in the physical world.’ (Penrose, 1994). Leaning on the scientifically describable phenomenon, Penrose is known for his non-computational view of consciousness, meaning ‘appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this physical action cannot be properly simulated computationally.’ (Penrose, 1994), thus the phenomenon of consciousness can only arise in the presence of some non-computational physical process in the brain. While this may help describe his view on consciousness from a scientific standpoint, I think for the purpose of my paper it is also beneficial to present the philosophical thoughts Penrose puts forth.
‘To be conscious, I seem to have to be conscious of something, perhaps a sensation such as pain or warmth or a colorful scene or a musical sound; or perhaps I am conscious of a feeling such as puzzlement, despair, or happiness; or I may be conscious of the memory of some past experience…. I am prepared to believe that consciousness is a matter of degree and not simply something that is either there or no there. I take the word ‘consciousness’ to be synonymous with ‘awareness’.’ (Penrose, 1989). This may be vague when taken by itself but if we combine this belief with Penrose’s previous statements on consciousness being a scientifically describable ‘thing’, we can gather that Penrose’s would describe consciousness as something that has an aspect of scientifically describable properties given our current understanding of the physical world when applying the abstract mathematical laws to the known construct of the brain, yet admits there is a component or property we still do not understand since there is an intuitive subjective quality behind our conscious experience that as of now we cannot fully explain yet are able to identify is there.


Works Cited
Penrose, R. (1989). The emperor’s new mind : concerning computers, minds, and the laws of physics. Oxford University Press.
Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the mind : a search for the missing science of consciousness. Oxford              University Press.

7 comments:

  1. "widely accepted that a glass of water is not conscious"...

    Yes, but apparently this is less widely accepted than common sense might have predicted. There's been a boomlet of interest lately in the odd doctrine of panpsychism, the idea that everythinfg is to some degree, in some sense, conscious. That just seems weird to me, but if you want to explore it briefly you might check out Annaka Harris (Sam's wife) and her little book "Conscious: A Brief Guide to the Fundamental Mystery of the Mind" - https://www.amazon.com/Conscious-Brief-Guide-Fundamental-Mystery/dp/1982659459

    Also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AL5g-AY3l2E

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. As I wrote this a paper came to mind I had recently read about 'consciousness in plants' with the author suggesting the evidence of photosynthesis being the smoking gun. I believe Hameroff referenced it as supporting evidence for his theory on microtubules in the brain... I will have to find it again. I'll check out Annaka's book however I'm in the same camp as you... this just seems weird.

      Delete
  2. Geoffrey Giulini6:00 PM CST

    I believe that we cannot come up with a clear definition of what consciousness is because everyone defines consciousness in their own unique way. Some people use their conscious to help them make decisions throughout the day whereas, some other people are constantly battling with their own conscious.

    ReplyDelete
  3. And for the record, two of Penrose's leading critics:

    Daniel Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea ch 15-"The Emperor's New Mind & other Fables"

    Dennett: Penrose candidly admits that none of his reasons for believing in the non-computability of quantum gravity theory are drawn from quantum physics itself; the only reason he has for thinking that a theory of quantum gravity would be noncomputable is that otherwise AI would be possible after all. In other words, Penrose has a hunch that someday we're going to find a skyhook. This is the hunch of a brilliant scientist, but he himself admits that it is only a hunch."

    Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works, ch 2-"Thinking Machines"

    Pinker: "...unconnected to discovery and explanation in scientific practice... empirically sterile, contributing no insight and inspiring no discoveries on how the mind works... Penrose's denunciation of the computational theory of mind turns out to be a backhanded compliment. The computational theory fits so well into our understanding of the world that, in trying to overthrow it, Penrose had to reject most of contemporary neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and physics!"

    Pinker also says:

    Consciousness is typically defined as "building an internal model of the world that contains the self,” “reflecting back on one's own mode of understanding,” and other kinds of navel-gazing that have nothing to do with consciousness as it is commonly understood: being alive and awake and aware."

    That's it, fundamentally (in my view): consciousness is "being alive and awake and aware" of oneself as an experiencing, intelligent, sensitive, subjective organism, with a sense of what it is specifically like to be that individual.

    So one question is: does that accord with Penrose's understanding of consciousness? And: does his theory reflect and support this loose definition?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I am continuing to read Penrose's works and it seems to me he is more concerned with the 'where' and the 'how' of consciousness and less inclined to take a stance on the 'what'. After watching his debate with Craig, my take away was Penrose is merely trying to present a theory of consciousness rooted within our current understanding of the physical laws we observe. It's as if he warrants us to leave the definition of consciousness up to our 'common sense' as he states and almost as an after thought... and this is what I feel some of his critics are missing. Penrose never claims to have discovered WHAT consciousness is. He never even flatly denies what is ISN'T. In his debate with Craig, there are several moments when he is challenged into confirming or denying his stance on the possibility of a divine creator being involved in the creation of consciousness and while it is clear he does not see the justification in the evidence of this being a solution to the hard problem, he also does not directly deny the possibility. Penrose is open to other ideas as to WHAT consciousness is, as long as there is sufficient evidence to uphold the claims.

      I am yet unable to discuss Dennett v Penrose and Pinker v Penrose as I am up to my elbows in books and papers by all three authors. I will absolutely return and respond to each as I find these will undoubtedly be stimulating debates.

      Delete
  4. And, a propos the film "Ex Machina" and the question of whether machines "know" what they're doing, when (for instance) they play chess (etc.)...

    My view, which I think follows from Pinker's statement about how philosophers over-complexify consciousness, is that machines have not yet shown any sign of being subjectively self-aware and (hence) capable of knowing that they're playing chess - even when they're "beating" you at it.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AI’s hollow victory. Computers may beat humans at chess, Go, and Jeopardy. Unlike us, though, they can’t enjoy their success... https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/the-ai-delusion-why-humans-trump-machines-robots-artificial-intelligence-alpha-go-deepmind-marcus-davis-koch-mitchell-review

      Delete

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.