Who are we?
Both eastern and western philosophers have been trying to answer this question
and solve the mysteries it poses since the dawn of thought, and it has been the
source of much debate between them. One can simply say, “I am me,” but
philosophers won’t likely find that answer satisfactory. Who is “me?” Is this
“me” a soul possessing a body and using it to communicate, or is “me” the
entire body, with no otherworldly connection? What is it that makes “me” you? These
are all questions of personal identity.
Skeptics
like Pyrrho might argue that we have no idea knowing who or what we are, that
we could merely be the dreams of someone else. Rene Descarte would admit only
the most simple thing about himself, that he existed, with his quote “I think,
therefore I am.”
Aristotle has a similar idea, claiming that a person must, while perceiving anything, also perceive their own existence.
Aristotle has a similar idea, claiming that a person must, while perceiving anything, also perceive their own existence.
The two
philosophers most famous for their ideas on the question of personal identity
are John Locke and Thomas Reid. According to Locke’s philosophy, psychological
continuity makes us who we are. That is, we are the same person that we
remember being, and we are not anyone we do not remember being. Reid thought
differently; according to Reid, overlapping memories establishes the connection
to who we were and who we are now. This means that if we forget our childhood
but remember our young adulthood, we are the same person as when we were kids,
as long as we remembered our childhood when we were a young adult.
Imagine a
child born a prince, but who was separated at a young age from his parents and
forced to travel with a group of merchants. He remains a merchant for many
years and often thinks of what would have been if he had remained prince.
Decades later, he retires and becomes a baker, who eventually forgets his
childhood. According to Locke, the baker is no longer the same as the prince
because he cannot remember himself way back then, but he is the same person as
the merchant because he still remembers that part of his life. Thomas Reid
disagrees, saying that because the merchant remembers being a prince, and the
baker remembers being a merchant, then they all must be the same person. Reid’s
idea can be explained mathematically.
If X=Y and Y=Z, then
X must also equal Z.
If Prince=Merchant,
and Merchant=Baker, then Prince must also equal Baker.
Another
aspect of personal identity can be examined with another scenario called the
ship of Theseus. Imagine a ship sailed by Theseus in a battle that was kept in
a harbor. A few weeks later a board begins to rot, so the caretaker has that board replaced. Is it still the same ship Theseus sailed?
Imagine
further that over the next century, the caretaker has more and more of the ship
replaced as necessary. By the end, every part has been replaced and thrown in a
warehouse. Is the ship now the same as the ship Theseus sailed, even though
none of the parts are the same? If not, when is the ship able to be considered
different? If someone found out how to reverse the rotting of the wood and put
the fixed pieces back together to reconstruct the ship, would that ship
retroactively become the same ship the Theseus used? Can both the reassembled
ship and the repaired ship be the same?
People can
be viewed in a very similar way; though our parts are not as easy to replace as
a ships, our own values can be disposed of and replaced over time, as well as
our organs and atoms that make us up. Is someone a new person after receiving a
kidney transplant? When someone changes religions, are they someone new? At
what point is it truthful to say, “I am not that person anymore?” These
questions, like most questions of personal identity, are nearly impossible to
answer, yet some of the most interesting to discuss.
Quiz
1. Who
would have said that there is no reliable way to prove we exist?
2. Who
said that we must perceive ourselves whenever we perceive anything else?
3. How
did Thomas Reid poke a hole in John Locke’s idea of continuous memories?
4. What
is the ship of Theseus?
Discussion
Do you think people can change like the ship of Theseus? If
so, at what point do you think that the change occurs?
Comments on other Posts
The ship of Theseus analogy is fascinating, since the body is constantly regenerating, replacing cellular matter etc., yet retaining continuity and identity. Even more to the point than what holds us together physiologically, though, is what makes all my memories and anticipations univocally MINE in a subjective and interior way of knowing? I still think it's not memory and intention per se, but the narrative stories we construct around them. That's a way of thinking about identity that admits the possibility of being the same human organism over time while constantly changing in ways both subtle and profound. Contrary to Goober, you can be yourself AND you can change.
ReplyDeleteWhat a fascinating topic, Samual! You're right to describe it as a perrenial subject of philosophy, and I think it is also one that ordinary people engage all the time (often without knowing). Religious conceptions of identity and transformation are a great example of this. Locke and Reid make nice conversation partners on this, so it was good to hear from them both. I agree with Dr. Oliver that the ship of Theseus analogy, like many thought experiments, provokes some great reflection. I'd be interested to hear what you think: Is personal identity based on some sort of continuity in the body, the mind, or . . . ? I myself am reluctant to put too much stock in physiology given that, as has been pointed out, so much of that is subject to change. Of course, what's in the mind is also––to a lesser degree, I think––subject to change, but I'd trust that as a basis for identity over the body. Interestlingly, this seems to be part of the perspective for religious transformation of identity. A convert wouldn't say they're a new person based on how they look but based on how they think/behave/etc. There's a spiritual layer I wouldn't buy into with that, since I see the "mind" as having a physical rather than immaterial nature. Still, there seems to be some overlap that might be worth exploring. All in all a great presentation, Samual, and a well-written post. Great work!
ReplyDeleteMy favorite thing about the topic of personal identity is that there is no correct answer. Personally, my favorite conclusion to the puzzle is that I am constantly changing and becoming a "new person." I'm not the same Sam that I was five minutes ago, I'm a new Sam. I may be 99.9 percent similar to that Sam, but I'm not the same. Another proposed answer to the Ship of Theseus is that the ship that has been repaired and totally replaced, and the scraps of the original that were reassembled, are both actually the ship because one has a psychological continuity with the original and the other has a physical continuity with the original. I would say that neither are the original, but there is no way to say for certain. That is the glory of personal identity.
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