Up@dawn 2.0

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

14-1: Consequential Qualifications


            Charles Peirce’s philosophy has reflects scientific methodology—after all, Peirce was not only a philosopher, but also a physical scientist. For Peirce, meaning was always consequential—the reaction of an action. However, Peirce’s “pragmaticism” is not quite the same as sheer practicality. In fact, Peirce’s thinking was full of abstract flourishes that cannot be encompassed by the word "practicality." Perhaps the notion that philosophy should be practical was only secondary to another idea—the root of Peirce’s philosophy: the belief that concepts, in order to be meaningful, must be defined by the empirical observations that result. Of course, the only way one can observe the effects of a concept is by applying it. Maybe that’s why Peirce so ardently fought to separate his ideas from that of successive American philosophers like William James: through interpretation, the root of his philosophy was lost, replaced by the much more exoteric approach of practicality.
            Nevertheless, we compared Peirce’s philosophy to that of Plato. Peirce’s philosophy lacks the essentialist quality of Plato's. While Plato believed that objects possess certain qualities of Forms, Peirce believed that objects only possess qualities because of the evidence, not essence.


Let's play a game called "Is This a Rock or a Moldy Loaf of Bread?" The rules are simple: follow Peirce's pragmaticism, in which case the quality of this object can be determined only by empirical evidence.


            If Peirce believed that we discover truth by observation, in degrees, then it makes sense that he also believed ultimate truth was a destination that, in time, we would eventually reach—by universal agreement, of course. Our group didn't quite agree with Peirce. If the truth could be so easily observed, we wouldn't be asking so many questions. Maybe we can't always equate truth with fact. Peirce's universal agreement is also unlikely, if not impossible.
            Simply, the difference between the two pragmatists (although Peirce would regard that classification in contempt) seems to be this: for Peirce, truth was external and evidential; for James, it was internal and inherent.

4 comments:

  1. I found myself disliking Peirce's views when contrasted with James's views. I felt as though Peirce relied heavily on science and experiments.

    Factual question: Peirce thought _____ _______ were nonsense, and ______ was what led to truth.
    A: abstract theories, experiments

    Discussion question: Should we only view truth as things that can be tested and proven?

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  2. Ian Mallari8:38 PM CDT

    I tend to agree about Peirce. James's notion about defining something before arguing about it makes perfect sense. And I do feel like it would soften many heated arguments. However, I do see Peirce's point about only seeing truth in things that can be proven... because as humans, we need verification. Without that, we get skeptical.

    Factual question: William James was what type of philosopher?
    A: Pragmatist

    ReplyDelete
  3. I believe we should both view truth as something that can be tested but also in the same sense how exactly can you prove all truths. some would be very difficult, and after all if it was so easy then we wouldn't be asking so many questions.

    ReplyDelete
  4. The truth is only the truth if all aspects of it are to be revealed and understood by those who are asking the questions. trying to get everyone to understand the terminology used is part of revealing the truth. therefor the conversation has to be translated and then understood by everyone trying to define it. i want the truth to be understood in clear terms for sure.

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